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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of trade agreements among SAARC countries on
intraregional exports using a generalized gravity model and panel dataset for the period 1971
to 2005. Empirical tests find scant evidence of the impact of trade agreements on exports for
the pre-SAARC and pre-SAPTA periods, but statistically significant and positive impact is
observed in the post-SAARC and post-SAPTA periods even amidst sustained significant neg-
ative impact of conflict in all sub-periods. This propensity is discernible regardless of the esti-
mation methods applied. However, further tests show that the positive impact emanated not
expressly owing to SAPTA per se, but it is rather the effect arising from the delayed impact of
the existing trade agreements among the SAARC countries.
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1. Introduction
The issue of free trade and regional integration is becoming synonymous with trade liber-
alization and a subject of avid interest in the arena of international trade and politics today. It
has been essentially taking the form of bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), preferential trading
arrangements (PTAs), regional trading arrangements (RTAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs).
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was conceived in Dhaka,
Bangladesh on December 8, 1985 by the late president Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh with the
broad objectives of economic, social, cultural and scientific cooperation among seven South
Asian nations, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
South Asia is home to more than one-fifth of the world’s population, and therefore, it is
believed to have the potential to become an area of great prosperity based on the idea of grow-
ing trade among the member countries. Increased trade, particularly intraregional exports, is
expected to be a driving force for economic growth in the region. To this end, the South Asian
Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in Dhaka on April 11, 1993 to give a
boost to regional trade integration, which came into operation in 1995. Four rounds of
exchange of trade concessions have taken place under the SAPTA. A large number of products
have been offered with concessions exclusively to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). India
has offered the largest number of concessions, particularly favoring LDCs with tariff prefer-
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ences ranging from 50-100 per cent (Mukherji, 2004).
Inspired by the worldwide trends and successful experience of India-Sri Lanka bilateral
FTA, leaders of SAARC countries have decided to facilitate intraregional trade with the sign-
ing of South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) on January 6, 2004, which was ratified on
January 1, 2006 and consequently became operational from July 1, 2006. Based on this, the
SAARC members have agreed to bring down the average tariffs on goods from 25-30 per cent
to 0-5 per cent over the next decade. Separate deadlines have been set for the developing
countries, i.e., India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and the LDCs, which are Bhutan, Bangladesh,
Maldives and Nepal. SAFTA calls for reduction in import duties to 20 per cent by 2008 and
between 0-5 per cent by 2013, but allows the LDCs to reduce the tariff rates to 0-5 per cent by
the year 2016 (SAFTA, 2005).
Like the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
other like-minded trade blocs, SAARC countries share a lot of similarity in culture and socio-
economic conditions, but as opposed to the EU or the ASEAN blocs that have deep connec-
tions in political, economic and executive areas, members in the SAARC bloc are all in their
developing phases and are characteristically far less integrated. Many researchers argue that the
volume of intraregional trade continues to be low, despite SAARC’s efforts to enhance intrare-
gional trade through bilateral and preferential trading arrangements. In view of the downsides,
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Table 1 Status of Trade Agreements among SAARC Countries
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources.
SAARC recognizes the need to move towards a more pragmatic approach to regional coopera-
tion. Over the years, the seven South Asian nations have signed several trade agreements (see
Table 1). However, none of the earlier studies has attempted to evaluate the actual impact of
trade agreements on intra-SAARC trade. Moreover, most of the studies have omitted the effect
on small countries, such as Bhutan and Maldives in their analyses. This may be partly due to
the scarcity of data and small size of these economies, or perhaps due to lack of researchers’
interest because of its negligible influence in the region. Whatsoever the reasons are, there is an
apparent need to fill up this vacuum. Hence, examining the feasibility and potential of South
Asian trading arrangements is a highly desirable case study.
The objective of this study is, therefore, to investigate whether the trade agreements
among seven SAARC countries have actually boosted the volume of intraregional exports.
The plain hypothesis is that trade agreements among SAARC members is expected to be posi-
tively associated with exports, ceteris paribus, as the principal reason for member countries to
enter into trade agreements is the prospect of enhancing their exports and furthering trade cre-
ation.1 In light of this, the paper specifically addresses the following key questions:
• What is the actual impact of trade agreements among SAARC countries? 
• Have they affected positively or negatively on the growth of exports, and to what extent?
• Did SAPTA play a catalytic role of enhancing the intra-SAARC trade?
One of the contributions of this paper is to answer the above questions and to provide fur-
ther evidence by estimating a gravity model, which uses a distinctive panel dataset for over a
long period spanning 35 years from 1971 to 2005. This period is preferred for three reasons.
First, there are very few studies conducted for the SAARC region that seeks to investigate the
trade effects over this long period of time. Second, Bangladesh became an independent coun-
try in the year 1971.2 Third, this long period facilitates the dataset to be divided into sub-peri-
ods, enabling to contrast and examine the impacts of trade agreements on exports in different
time periods. While addressing the above-mentioned questions, this study also tests the effica-
cy of free trade agreements in furthering exports, and particularly for the SAARC region, this
is the first of its kind. The focus, as such, is to recount the findings after testing the effects of
trade agreements before the inception of SAARC and SAPTA, and comparing and contrasting
with the post-SAARC and post-SAPTA periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical
foundation and assessment of regional trade integration in South Asia. The empirical method-
ology and sources of data is presented in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. The regression
results are examined in Sections 5, while Section 6 summarizes the key findings and con-
cludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
Although there are some qualitative studies on SAARC and SAPTA, quantitative studies
centering on economic integration in South Asia are limited. Bandara and Yu (2003) point out
a number of possible reasons for this. Firstly, many trade analysts have not given much atten-
tion since this region did not play a major role in the global trade, investment and growth.
Secondly, the data on trade and other variables in this region are scarce. Thirdly, as the volume
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1 Despite theoretical skepticism of RTAs and the like, ‘most empirical studies find that trade creation dominates trade
diversion’ (Rodríguez-Delgado, 2007, p.14).
2 Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan on March 26, 1971 after the Bangladesh Liberation War.
and value of informal trade are very high, published data do not reflect the true picture of
trade structure in the region. Finally, while there is much focus on nontariff barriers compared
to many other regions in the world, the recognition and quantification of nontariff barriers are
difficult. Despite the limitations, available studies may be broadly classified into three differ-
ent views: pessimistic, optimistic and neutral or cautionary.
From the pessimistic point of view, Hassan et al. (2002) finds that SAARC countries
have not only reduced trade among them but also reduced trade with non-members. Singh
(2005, p.1) observes the intraregional trade low at about only five percent of the total trade.
The author cites the lack of trade complementarities, prevalence of sizeable informal trade,
and political tensions as some of the ‘culprits’. Chowdhury (2004) examined the issue of con-
vergence of per capita GDP across SAARC countries. The results from his analysis fail to find
evidence of convergence. The reasons for non-convergence of per capita GDP is explained by
low and falling volume of intra-country trade, weak governance, and low level of growth of
individual SAARC countries. Jayaratne (2004) also points out that some issues that have pre-
vented effective regional integration of South Asian nations from more rapid development and
benefiting from cross border and global trade and investments are political disputes, macro-
economic instability, policy deficiencies, lack of a common position, and low implementation
capability among others. Pitigala (2005, p.42) shows that ‘South Asian countries can be char-
acterized only moderately as “natural trading partners”’, and therefore the trade structures
among the South Asian countries may not facilitate a rapid increase in intraregional trade.
In comparison with the rest of the world, the economic size of the SAARC region is small
in terms of both GDP and share in the world trade. Recent studies show the economic case,
even for SAFTA as pretty weak. For instance, Baysan et al. (2006) argues that it is quite unlike-
ly that trade diversion would be dominant as a result of SAFTA, as it is reinforced by high lev-
els of protection in the form of restrictive sensitive lists and stringent rules of origin. Similarly,
Kalegama (2004) asserts that ‘… not much can be expected from SAFTA. The initial euphoria
that comes with the signing of the SAFTA agreement will soon taper away. The realities and
the geo-politics of the region will once again determine the pace of negotiations in SAFTA.’3
Conversely, optimists including Bandara and McGillivray (1998) describe signs of
progress in liberalizing South Asian trade regimes in the 1990s, even if most of the pro-
grammes in South Asian countries, with exception of Sri Lanka, have been slow. They find the
recent economic growth in the region quite satisfactory and are likely to continue in the near
future. Perhaps, it is for this reason that Bhargava (1998, p.22) suggests South Asians to learn
from the European experience. He believes that ‘the coming decades will witness meaningful
cooperation between the two largest configurations of democratic states in the continents of
Europe and Asia in order to build a better world.’ The recent move by the EU to become an
observer in the SAARC group, indeed, forms the basis towards his line of thinking.
Mohanty (2003) emphasizes that the region has a substantial potential for trade and
investment. He rejects the hypothesis that South Asian countries compete among themselves
to export similar kind of products to the world market leading to very low level of regional
trade. His study finds a significant level of trade potential in the region to promote intrare-
gional trade, and estimates the export potential to be more than six times than the present level
of intraregional trade if it is harnessed completely. Mukherji (2004) reckons that bilateral
trade among member countries can be self-sustaining when backed by investment linkages.
His work demonstrates some modalities by which SAPTA could transform swiftly to SAFTA.
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He stresses that the Trade Liberalization Programme that will be launched under SAFTA must
take a more consolidated approach by removing a variety of nontariff barriers, and setting
well-defined targets to promote a number of trade facilitation measures. Likewise, CUTS
(2005, p.3) notes, ‘SAFTA would be a vehicle through which all participants can gain by
exploring their competitive advantages. Integration of economies in South Asia would lead to
the emergence of a big market for investors.’ In the most recent study, Rodriguez-Delgado
(2007) estimated the economic impacts of SAFTA using a gravity model covering the data
from 1988-2004. Studying the impact of tariff reductions on the GDP, he estimates that
SAFTA can provide the highest increase for SAARC countries in terms of trade flows that
they could expect from any RTAs.
Dash (1996) argues from more or less neutral perspective that, given the low level of
mutual trust, effects of ethnic and religious conflicts, and extent of bilateral disputes in South
Asia, it is unrealistic to believe that any substantial growth of regional cooperation is possible
without easing political tensions. To evaluate the magnitude of preferential trade under
SAPTA, Mukherji (2000) estimated the extent of trade preference under all SAPTA rounds in
terms of trade values and percentages of preferential imports. The estimates show that the
region’s total preferential imports amounted to about US$479.8 million, nearly half of which
went to Pakistan. India’s share of preferential trade out of total regional preferential imports
was about 26 per cent, while that for Sri Lanka was about 16 per cent. In terms of its total
regional imports, he finds that Pakistan had the highest coverage of preferential imports
(about 40 per cent), followed by Nepal (35 per cent), India (30 per cent), Bhutan (17 per cent)
and Sri Lanka (12 per cent).
Using gravity equation and a panel data for 1996-2002, Hirantha (2004) showed strong
evidence of trade creation in the region with no trade diversion effect as far as trade with non-
members is concerned. Pattanaik (2006, p.140) has more of a cautionary approach to
SAARC’s future. He opines that if SAARC continues to remain ‘stymied’ and the smaller
states do not actively integrate, even India’s hopes of integrating with other relevant groups
will be stifled. The smaller members that seek to gain from the opening of a large and growing
Indian economy would also be the losers if SAARC does not prosper. Accordingly, Ghani and
Din (2006, p.4) construe that an effective implementation of SAFTA and other regional initia-
tives ‘will require a strong willingness of all members for greater economic integration as well
as a favourable political environment in the region.’
Kemal (2004) describes that the trade patterns of the SAARC group vary sharply from
country to country. For instance, the share of intraregional imports in total imports in 2000 for
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka stood at 11.7 per cent, 33.2 per cent and 10.1 per cent
respectively. During the same year, Pakistan and India met only 2.3 per cent and 0.7 per cent
respectively of their import requirements from the region. Taneja (2006) points out that South
Asia is the least integrated region compared to the East Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Latin
America, the Middle East and North Africa. Intraregional trade in South Asia is only 0.8 per
cent of GDP, one-eighth of the Latin America’s level, and only a fraction of East Asia’s nearly
27 per cent of GDP. However, India’s share in total SAARC trade increased from 38 per cent
in 1991 to 45 per cent in 2004. Therefore, Taneja believes that if India and Pakistan could tap
the region’s trade potential, intra-SAARC trade could undoubtedly reach newer heights.
Another topic currently under review is the issue on adopting a common currency in the
region. For instance, Saxena (2005) examines if SAARC countries can satisfy the criteria to
form an optimal currency area. The author surmises that the benefits of a common currency
would materialize from peace between India and Pakistan that economic integration would
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bring about.
In sum, we can recapitulate that the future of SAARC countries depends, inter alia, not
only on the level of economic integration, but it is also largely determined by the political sound-
ness in the region. Without easing political tensions, conflicts, and mistrust among the member
nations, it is quite unlikely to hope for any substantive trade integration in the region. Thus, the
growth of regional economic cooperation in South Asia calls for committed efforts and strong
political will from all leaders to bring about peace, harmony, and social security in the region.
3. Methodology
This paper estimates a generalized gravity model or so-called unilateral exports model,
which was applied in earlier works of Mátyás et al. (2000) and Aristotelous (2001), and more
recently by Baak (2004) and Billen et al. (2005). With slight modification from a typical grav-
ity model, the generalized gravity model assigns not the product of the exports of two trading
countries as in the paper by Dell’ Ariccia (1999), but the exports from one country to another
as the regressand. The advantage of this is that it allows including depreciation of exporting
country’s currency value as one of the regressors that affects the volume of exports. Moreover,
as small countries are expected to export less than big countries, ceteris paribus, the dummies
for exporting countries can be included (Baak 2004, p.100). As initiated by Rose (2004, p.99),
the gravity equation in this paper is further augmented by controlling for a number of ‘natural
causes of trade’ or ‘extraneous factors’ including in economic, cultural, political and geo-
graphical variables that may affect trade.
Regressions are designed in such a way as to capture the effects of trade agreements with
respect to both Pre-SAARC and Post-SAARC periods. The sample is broken down into five
groups. Table 2 shows the design of regressions conducted in this study. Only five countries are
included in the Pre-SAARC I Period (1971-1979) owing to missing data for the period before
1980 for two countries, Bhutan and Maldives. All other periods include seven countries. 4
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the 14th Summit held in New Delhi, India on April 3-4, 2007.
Table 2 Regression Design
3.1 Model Specification
The gravity equation in this paper is different for two reasons. First, the model does not
use the total trade flows comprising exports and imports, but exports from one country to
another as the regressand. Intuitively, exports of one country are the imports of another coun-
try. When both exports and imports are accounted for in trade flows, and if imports are regis-
tered much higher than exports, the volume of trade may seemingly be inflated. Moreover,
exports in a sense tend to have economic characteristics associated in theory with welfare-
enhancing net trade creation effect. Second, this model does not include the exporting coun-
try’s GDP as one of the regressors to avoid endogeneity problems, as exports form part of the
exporting country’s GDP (Billen et al., 2006).
Accordingly, the gravity model takes the following form: 
where i, j and t stands for exporting country, importing country and time, respectively; Xijt
denotes real exports from i to j at time t; GDPjt is the real gross domestic product of j at time
t; POPNit is the population of i at time t; DREXijt is the depreciation rate of the real bilateral
exchange rate of i with respect to j at time t; DISTij is the great circle distance between i and j;
BORDij is a dummy variable which is one if i and j share a common border, and zero other-
wise; LANGij is a dummy variable which is one if i and j share a common language, and zero
otherwise; CURRijt is a dummy variable which is one if i and j use common currency at time t,
and zero otherwise; TRAGijt is a dummy variable which is one for having trade agreement
between i and j at time t, or zero otherwise; CONFijt is the index value for conflict between i
and j at time t; MEMBijt is a dummy variable for membership in other regional trade group(s),
which is one if i and j are part of a common free trade area at time t, and zero otherwise;
LLOCKij is a dummy variable equal to one if a country is landlocked, and zero otherwise;
ILANDij is a dummy variable equal to one if a country is an island, and zero otherwise; PORTij
is a dummy variable equal to one if a country has access to sea ports, and zero otherwise;
SAPTAijt is a dummy variable for South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement, which is one
if i and j are part of this agreement at time t, and zero otherwise; CD an TD denote country
dummy and time trend dummy respectively;β,δandφ are vectors of nuisance coefficients;
andεijt is the error term or any other omitted influences.
More specifically, the paper estimates a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) data model,
but for robustness checks it also performs some sensitivity analyses using country and time
dummy effects, first differencing, instrument variables (IV), fixed effects and random effects
models. The parameters of interest are β8 ,β9 andβ14 , i.e., the coefficients for trade agree-
ment (TRAG), conflict (CONF), and South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA),
respectively. Except for dummy variables, all other variables take on log values to narrow the
range of variable and to make estimates less sensitive to outlying or extreme observations on
the regressand and regressors. The novelty of this paper is that the effect of TRAG is measured
vis-á-vis CONF that might likely offset for any frailty of results obtained by using only TRAG
as one of the regressors. This variable is selected particularly as a consequence of its strong
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influence in determining the magnitude of trade in the SAARC bloc.
3.2 Correction for Endogeneity Bias and Heteroskedasticity
In order to mitigate the potential endogeneity bias resulting from a possible correlation
between the TRAG and unobserved characteristics, the paper follows some corrective proce-
dures as inspired by earlier researchers. Baier and Bergstrand (2005) distinguish a standard
problem in cross-section empirical work is the potential endogeneity of right-hand side (RHS)
variables. If any of the RHS variables in equation (1) is correlated with the gravity equation
error termεijt , the variable is considered econometrically endogenous and the OLS may yield
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. They argue that the potential endogeneity bias of
RHS variables may arise due to omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error. In
fact, omitted variables are often the major source of endogeneity bias in gravity equations.
Particularly with respect to bilateral trade arrangements, the unobserved heterogeneity in trade
flow determinants is associated with the decision of whether or not to form an FTA. For
instance, in their earlier work, Baier and Bergstrand (2004, pp.6-8) find strong empirical evi-
dence that pairs of countries that have FTAs are likely to share similar economic characteris-
tics. That is, the probability of two countries’ governments seeking to enter into FTA may be
high if they expect a large welfare gain from potential bilateral trade creation further deepen-
ing liberalization beyond tariff barriers and other non-tariff barriers into ‘domestic regula-
tions’. This means that TRAGijt and the intensity of domestic regulations could be positively
correlated, butεijt and the intensity of domestic regulations could be negatively correlated. As
a result, TRAGijt andεijt can be negatively correlated, and the TRAGijt coefficient will tend to
be underestimated. Therefore, they underscore the importance of addressing the endogeneity.
Fortunately, for cross-section data, we can address the problem of omitted variables by includ-
ing IV; and for panel data, fixed effects and first differencing can be effectively applied to
treat endogeneity biases (see Wooldridge, 2003).
Mátyás (1997, 1998), and Harris and Mátyás (1998) also suggest a pooled time-series of
cross-sections or panel data in order to identify these biases and correctly specify the economet-
ric model. They advocate the panel data to increase degrees of freedom, to enable identification
of business cycle, and correctly account for exporting and importing country effects. Such
effects can be treated as constants and estimated by fixed effects model in which one is able to
identify separately the unobserved effects of those countries that have strong propensities to
export and import, once divergences in other factors such as GDP, population, distance, etc. has
already been accounted for. As recommended in Harris and Mátyás’ work, this paper also addi-
tionally considers a random effects model, where the unobserved effects is assumed to be uncor-
related with the explanatory variables in each time period. All estimations employ heteroskedas-
ticity consistent covariance matrix estimator derived by White (1980), which provides correct
estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
Serial correlation is not an issue because the samples are independent across time.
3.3 Computation of Variables
Following Baak (2004) and Billen et al. (2005), some of the key economic variables in
this model have been computed as follows:
3.3.1 Real Exports
The real exports (Xijt ) from country i to country j is defined as
The Impact of Trade Agreements on Intraregional Exports: Evidence from SAARC Countries
30
where NXijt is the annual nominal exports (in US dollars) from country i to country j in
year t, and USDt is the US GDP deflator5 in year t.
3.3.2 Real GDP
The real GDP of an importing country j (GDPjt ) is defined as
where NGDPjt is the nominal GDP of country j measured by purchasing parity, and USDt
is the US GDP deflator in year t. This variable is a proxy for economic mass or size of the
trading country.
3.3.3 Depreciation of real bilateral exchange rate
The depreciation rate of an exporting country’s currency value (DREXijt ) is determined as
where REXijt is the real exchange rate, which is measured as
where NEXijt is the average nominal exchange rate between country i and country j in
year t, and CPIit and CPIjt denote consumer price index of country i and country j respectively
in year t. This variable stands as a proxy for prices.
4. Data
The data in this paper come from a wide range of sources. Annual nominal exports data (in
million US$) from the year 1971 to 2005 have been compiled from the IMF’s Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS). Missing exports data have been supplemented from the UN Comtrade, UNC-
TAD Handbook of Statistics and National Statistics Bureau of Bhutan. Nominal GDP (in con-
stant 2000 US$) and population data were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI). The US GDP deflator, nominal exchange rates, and consumer price indices
have been gathered from the IMF’s International Finance Statistics (IFS).
The data for distances between two countries were calculated using the Great Circle
Distance Between Capital Cities and Time and Date.com. The geographical distance is the
theoretical air distance, i.e., the great circle distance. Unless the capital cities of two trading
countries are major hubs or trade centers, this paper considers the distance between the major
trade centers of two countries. This is because if the great circle distance is measured between
the capital cities of two countries, it could probably underestimate or overestimate the actual
gravity factor between two trading partners.
The index for conflict variable was taken from Conflictbarometer 2005, Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research, Department of Political Science, University of
Heidelberg. Other country-specific variables such as border, language, currency, trade agree-
ments, membership in other regional blocs, landlocked and island and status and seaports were
obtained from the CIA’s The World Factbook, SAARC’s official homepage and related websites.
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5 Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) and Baier and Bergstrand (2005) also scaled the data by GDP deflators to generate
real exports and real GDPs.
Additionally, as evoked by Baier and Bergstrand (2005), the paper also introduces some
political variables as instruments (z variables hereafter) that might have some correlation in
two governments’ decision to form an FTA, but may not have correlation with their exports.
Past studies such as by Jaggers and Gurr (1999), Mansfield et al. (2002), and Kaufmann et al.
(2003) reflect the fact that two countries are more inclined to form FTAs if their governments
are more democratic. Therefore, three governance indicators have been selected as z variables
from the World Bank’s Governance and Anti-Corruption, as F Test suggests that they are joint-
ly significant. These are: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Rule of Law, and (iii) Control of
Corruption. The variables are measured in terms of percentile rank (0 to 100) – zero represent-
ing as the lowest and 100 as the highest.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Pooled OLS Estimation (Benchmark)
Table 3 presents the estimation results for pooled OLS data. The following findings
emerge from the estimation. The estimated coefficients values are conventional and quite sta-
ble across all sub-periods. The coefficients for gross domestic product (GDP), population
(POPN), depreciation rate of real bilateral exchange rate (DREX), distance (DIST), border
(BORD), common currency (CURR), trade agreement (TRAG), conflict (CONF) and member-
ship in ORTG (MEMB) are statistically significant and the signs are mostly as expected.
While countries with seaports (PORT) have positive and significant coefficient, landlocked
(LLOCK) and island countries (ILAND) show negative and/or insignificant impacts on exports
in general, which are also as expected. The negative coefficient for MEMB is expected and
supports the findings of Pitigala (2005, p.42) since SAARC members are not so much charac-
terized as ‘natural trading partners’ for most SAARC members demonstrate a tendency to
trade outside the region.
In contrast to our expectations, the coefficient for DIST is counterintuitive and statistical-
ly significant at 10 per cent level of significance in the sub-period 1. One principal reason for
this can be attributed to the fact that the closest neighbors, namely, India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh were hostile to each other during the period on account of the 1971 Bangladesh
Liberation War (Mukti Juddho) or what is commonly known as the Indo-Pakistan War of
1971. Hence, trade plummeted sharply for these countries during the period. The only two
countries that were engaged in formal trade were Nepal and Sri Lanka, which are the most
distant countries in the region. Therefore, in this case, the result cannot be interpreted in a
causal fashion.
The coefficients for LLOCK and PORT are also more or less consistent to expectations.
However, the negative coefficient for PORT in the sub-period 2 could appear as result of reper-
cussions of the war among three major countries in the earlier sub-period 1, as noted above.
One result that attracts attention is the negative and statistically significant coefficient for
language (LANG) for the sub-period 2 through 5, while our conventional wisdom tells us that
it should have a positive coefficient. The reason goes back to none other than the above-men-
tioned interpretation, wherein most of the trading partners in the region with similar languages
have been exhibiting animosity against each other due to history of war and contentions,
thereby resulting in less trade and nullifying the expected positive impact.
Another parameter of interest is the coefficient for CONF, which is negatively associated
with exports at 1 per cent significance level against a two-sided alternative across all periods.
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In sub-period 1, the coefficient for CONF is -0.86, suggesting that the presence of conflict
between two trading partners decreases exports by about 58 per cent (e–0.86). Similarly, in sub-
period 2, sub-period 3, sub-period 4 and sub-period 5, the negative impact of CONF is reflect-
ed by the decrease in exports between the trading partners by about 46 per cent, 53 per cent,
46 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively. Given the scenario of hostility and incessant discord
among SAARC members as already discussed above, this result is not surprising.
Of special interest in this regression result is the coefficient for TRAG, which is negative
and statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance for the sub-period 1 and sub-
period 2, insignificant in the sub-period 3, and then positive and highly significant again in
the sub-period 4 and sub-period 5. It is quite evident that before SAARC came into existence,
intraregional trade was much lower among the South Asian nations. Even after the inception
of SAARC in 1985, the impact is not significant during the sub-period 3.  However, the
impact of TRAG can be clearly observed in the sub-period 4 and sub-period 5, i.e., after the
SAPTA came into operation in 1995. For instance, in the case of sub-period 2, which is the
period just before SAARC came into force, the coefficient of TRAG is -0.99, and the coeffi-
cient in sub-period 4, i.e., the period after SAPTA came into operation is 0.57. This implies
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Table 3 Gravity Equation Estimates for Pooled OLS Data Model (Benchmark)
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The regressand is the natural log of exports [ln(X ijt)]. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. 
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that even those countries that did have trade agreements had about 63 per cent (e–0.99) less
exports in the sub-period 2. However, in the sub-period 4, exports increased by about 77 per
cent (e0.57). There is a further increase in exports in the sub-period 5 by about 80 per cent (e0.58).
These results indicate that the impact of trade agreements is time-dependent, which is largely
consistent with the findings by Baier and Bergstrand (2005). Moreover, this strongly supports
our hypothesis and the case for deeper regional trade integration in South Asia.
5.2 Robustness Checks
Thus far, we have observed strong positive impact of trade agreements on exports, but are
the findings robust? To check the robustness of the benchmark results, some sensitivity analy-
ses are performed using country and time dummies, first differencing, IV technique, and fixed
as well as random effects models. For brevity, all tables of results are not shown.
5.2.1 Country Dummy Effects
With the introduction of country dummies, both GDP and POPN are still strongly associ-
ated with exports. The impact of DREX is found to be largely insignificant. This may be
because almost all SAARC countries follow a fixed exchange rate system and so the deprecia-
tion rates among these countries are negligible. Following similar trend in Table 3, the coeffi-
cient for DIST is found to be positive in the sub-period 1, but negative and significant for the
most part, which is typically expected. The coefficient for BORD turns out to be insignificant
and even negative in the sub-period 1 with the inclusion of country dummies. The estranged
relationship between India and Pakistan two major countries in the region could yet again
explain this phenomenon. Besides, although Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal also share a com-
mon border, the gravity effect of these smaller countries have so little impact relative to huge
economies of India and Pakistan.
The coefficients for LANG, CURR, TRAG and CONF show very similar pattern as in the
benchmark results. The interpretations for this are not different from what has been deliberat-
ed earlier. Nevertheless, a careful scrutiny demonstrates that the positive impact of TRAG has
slightly weakened in the sub-period 4 and sub-period 5. On the other hand, CONF has a fur-
ther negative impact on exports, as the exports during the sub-period 4 and sub-period 5
decreased by almost 59 per cent (e–0.90) and 51 per cent (e–0.72), respectively. Except for the sub-
period 2, PORT has a significant impact on exports in the sub-period 3, sub-period 4 and sub-
period 5.
Interestingly, economically larger countries, particularly India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
did not fare well in sub-period 1, displaying clearly the backlash of the war during the period.
Nevertheless, beginning from the sub-period 3, i.e., soon after SAARC came into being, trade
volume of these three countries picked up momentum with positive and significant impacts on
the regressand. As characteristic to gravity effects, small economies like Bhutan, Maldives
and Nepal are losers in the game, but it is interesting to note that during the sub-period 1 when
all major players were at conflict, only Nepal and Sri Lanka fared well as they continued to
have good terms of trade. During the period, DIST though positive, is not statistically different
from zero, which further justifies this observation.
5.2.2 Time Dummy Effects
Adding time dummies has little material effect on the estimated results. However, a few
points worth mentioning are the insignificant impacts of DREX and BORD; and the inclusion
of lag for TRAG has a stronger positive impact especially in the sub-period 5. Inclusion of one
lag for TRAG has an increased impact on coefficient from 0.47 to 0.49. With two lags, the
coefficient value leaped to 0.50.6 In regards to coefficients of the CONF variable, the trend is
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very similar with significantly negative impacts on exports for all sub-periods.
5.2.3 Country and Time Dummy Effects
There is not much variation in the results even after controlling for both country and time
dummy effects. In general, we observe that the TRAG and CONF effects retain similar trend.
However, the intensity of TRAG weakens in comparison to the earlier results.
5.2.4 First Differencing
First differencing is particularly useful when the unobserved factors that change over
time are serially correlated. Ifεijt follows a random walk, meaning that there is very substan-
tial positive serial correlation, then the difference Δεijt is serially uncorrelated, and therefore,
first differencing is a good alternative to solve this problem.7
Focusing again on the TRAG and CONF variables, the coefficients retain the expected
signs as before. TRAG has a highly significant positive impact on exports in the post-SAARC
periods, i.e., in the sub-period 4 and sub-period 5. The estimates suggest that TRAG increases
partner countries’ exports by about 127 per cent (e0.82) in the sub-period 4 and about 132 per
cent (e0.84) in the sub-period 5. CONF, on the other hand, has a negative impact in all periods,
and the coefficients are statistically significant from the sub-period 3 through sub-period 6,
but the impacts are lesser as compared to the earlier OLS estimates.
5.2.5 IV and 2SLS Estimation
A set of three z variables has been used as IV that is likely to influence the formation of
FTA and less likely to be correlated to the error term,εijt . The method of IV can be used to
solve the problem of endogeneity of one or more explanatory variables. This method applies
two staged least squares (2SLS or TSLS), which is second in popularity next to OLS for esti-
mating linear equations in applied econometrics.
Six different scenarios were tested using IV technique (see Table 4). The results obtained
by using z variables do not deviate much from the earlier results. The impact of TRAG is still
positive and statistically significant, while the impact of CONF is negative and statistically
significant. Nevertheless, in specifications 5 and 6, with the first differencing TRAG has a sig-
nificant impact on exports yielding an increase in exports by about 125 per cent ( e0.81) each,
respectively. Hausman Test is applied to compare the OLS and 2SLS estimates and to deter-
mine whether the differences are statistically significant. This procedure tests the null hypoth-
esis (H0) that the error termεijt of the OLS and the error term of the 2SLS (say, v2) are not cor-
related. The test fails to reject the H0 concluding the exogeneity of z variables becauseεijt and
v2 are not correlated. In addition, the testing of overidentifying restrictions used in the 2SLS
suggests that the model is just identified. Thus, the impact of TRAG in the last two specifica-
tions is consistent and reliable. Similar results from the first differencing method further justi-
fy the robustness of the estimates.
5.2.6 Fixed and Random Effects Models
F Test was conducted to test whether or not the fixed effects coefficients are equal or not
by comparing the sum of squared residuals (SSR) from the fixed effects model and the ran-
dom effects model. The computed p-value of zero soundly rejects the H0 of equal intercepts.
In addition, p-values of the Hausman Test are essentially zero for almost all periods, and so
the H0 of the random effects model in favor of the fixed effects model is rejected.
As in the pooled OLS model, one can also observe that almost all the coefficients of
GDP and POPN for both the fixed effects model and random effects model are statistically
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6 See Section 5.4 for more discussion on lagged effects of TRAG.
7 First differencing of the panel data yields some potential advantages over fixed effects. See Wooldridge (2003,
pp.467-468) for further details.
significant and positive, while the coefficient for the DIST is statistically significant with a
conventional negative coefficient. The coefficient for DREX is largely insignificant in the case
of both fixed and random effects.
5.3 Effect of SAPTA
Researchers, more often than not, have raised debates that SAPTA has not been the main
vehicle for enhancing intra-SAARC trade. This contentious argument necessitates further
empirical testing. As we have seen in the earlier tests that the impact of TRAG is mostly seen
in the sub-period 4 and sub-period 5, i.e., the period after SAPTA came into operation. This
gives a high possibility for us to conclude that the major impact on exports could have arisen
because of the SAPTA, and at the same time, undermine the role of TRAG as such. In order to
unravel this paradox, three more tests were carried out using SAPTA as one of the dummy
regressors (see Table 5).
Interestingly, SAPTA does not show significant impact at conventional significance levels
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Table 4 Gravity Equation Estimates using IV
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The regressand is the natural log of exports [ln(X ijt)]. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. Instrument
variables used are (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Rule of Law, and (iii) Control of Corruption.
even in the post-SAARC periods, and as we move backwards in time, SAPTA is rather nega-
tively associated with exports especially for those countries that do not have bilateral trade
agreements. On the other hand, it is fascinating to observe that TRAG has a significant impact
during the later two periods from 1985-2005 and from 1980-2005. Although the impact of
TRAG also diminishes as we move backwards towards the earlier period, the impact is not sta-
tistically significant. This could simply mean that the impact of TRAG increased over time
during the later sub-periods not particularly because of the inception of the SAPTA. Stated
otherwise, SAPTA has not been the main vehicle for increasing the impact of TRAG on
exports in the later periods. Therefore, the increased intraregional exports in the post-SAARC
periods could have apparently stemmed from the delayed impact of the existing bilateral trade
agreements among SAARC countries (as discussed further in the subsequent section).
5.4 Lagged Effects of TRAG
Table 6 shows the comparative lagged effects of TRAG. Adjusting for unobserved hetero-
geneity using country and time dummy effects provide impressive results. For instance, in spec-
ification (1), the impact of TRAG after 15 years (i.e., in 2000) from the inception of SAARC in
1985 is about 37 per cent increase, an increase by 1.37 times. During the same year, the impact
of TRAG is nearly 58 per cent, 52 per cent and 59 per cent in specification (2), (3) and (4),
respectively. However, in 2004 (after 19 years), there is a dramatic increase in the TRAG effects
from about 82 per cent in specification (1) to almost 119 per cent in specification (2), 121 per
cent in specification (3) and 128 per cent in specification (4). That is, the impact of TRAG is
more than twofold using country and time dummy effects. These results are evocative and con-
sistent with the findings of Baier and Bergstrand (2005), whose estimates suggest that an FTA
on average doubles two member countries’ bilateral trade after 10 years.8
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Table 5 Effects of SAPTA and TRAG
Source: Author’s estimation.
8 Using panel data, Rose (2004) estimated an FTA impact using fixed effects and found e0.94 or 156 per cent, while
Tomz (2004) estimated the FTA impact of e0.76 or 114 per cent.
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Note that the overall percentage increase of exports after 19 years from the base year
1985 to 2004 is 885 per cent (see Table 7). If we consider the cumulative average impact of
TRAG during this time period in specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4) in 2004 as 113 per cent,
then the independent role of the TRAG among different variables in enhancing intraregional
exports works out to be approximately 13 per cent. Understandably, it took nearly two decades
for TRAG to show reasonably clear impacts, which characterize the sluggish nature of
SAARC’s progress in trade integration.
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Table 6 Comparative Lagged Effects of TRAG
Note: The base year is 1985.
Source: Author’s estimation.
Table 7 Intra-SAARC Exports (1985-2004)
Note: The percentage increase is measured from the base year 1985.
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2005.
6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper estimated a generalized form of gravity model to determine the impact of
trade agreements on exports in the SAARC region. The model performed well empirically
yielding reasonably precise and good estimates, which are largely consistent with results of
the earlier studies employing a gravity model and pooled trade data.
The fundamental question that arose from the results was whether trade agreements have
had a significant positive impact on the volume of intraregional exports of SAARC countries.
The answer is yes, but one should interpret with caution. This is because the empirical tests
have found no evidence of the impact of trade agreements on exports in pre-SAARC I (sub-
period 1 from 1971 to 1979), pre-SAARC II (sub-period 2 from 1980 to 1984), and SAARC I
(sub-period 3 from 1985 to 1995). However, a significant positive impact of trade agreements
on exports is observed in SAARC II or post-SAPTA period (sub-period 4 from 1996 to 2005)
and for SAARC I+II (sub-period 5 from 1985 to 2005), even amidst sustained significant neg-
ative impact of conflict in all sub-periods. The phenomenon is observable irrespective of
which estimation methods are applied. Thus, the results soundly support the hypothesis indi-
cating positive benefits of having trade agreements among SAARC countries.
The next important question was to ascertain whether the signing of the SAPTA has stim-
ulated intra-SAARC trade in the region. Empirical tests find very little evidence of the impact
of SAPTA, signalling the failure of catalytic role played by SAPTA in inducing significant
trade creation within the region. Furthermore, tests show that the actual impact appears to
have emanated not specifically from the signing of SAPTA per se, but it is rather the effect
arising out of the delayed impact of the existing trade agreements.
This study definitely supports the case for FTAs and further trade integration among
SAARC member nations, clearly signalized by the positive impact of trade agreements seen in
the post-SAARC periods. With the growing interest of observers around the world, SAARC
will certainly find new opportunities, but one can only become more optimistic as SAPTA and
SAFTA matures through further dismantling of both tariff and nontariff barriers. The weak-
ness of SAPTA can be compensated by shaping and reinforcing the influence of SAFTA.
Although there are undoubtedly good prospects to boost up future exports, this would howev-
er, entail concerted efforts of the member nations to mitigate conflicts, evolve new compara-
tive advantages and complementarities, aggregate with other regional blocs, and eliminate the
existing impediments to intraregional trade with right perspective and affirmative political
will. In addition, SAARC should take a more holistic and forward-looking approach by
including deeper forms of integration in other trade facilitation measures such as services,
energy, institutional and infrastructure development, monetary and investment cooperation.
Notwithstanding, the model was kept simple using widely accepted techniques and con-
ventional empirical methodology. Future work could aim to customize models with more con-
temporary techniques. It might also be interesting to consider addressing the welfare implica-
tions of trade integration, and exploring the relevance and potential for pan-Asian-European
economic cooperation. Another area would be to investigate the effects of emerging scenario
in SAARC’s future membership and new perspectives. Finally, while the focus of this paper
was mainly to see the impact of trade agreements on exports, other fitting macroeconomic
variables may well be considered. This is only a beginning for further probing.
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